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Searches and Seizures in the Military Justice System
This note presents a review and analysis of the Court of Military
Appeals' (COMA) recent, significant fourth amendment decisions dealing
with the lawfulness of searches for and seizures of evidence.' The cases to be
discussed primarily concern: procedures which will insure the validity of a
consent search; 2 admissibility at a trial by court-martial of evidence which4
3
has been obtained by foreign officials; searches incident to a lawful arrest;
and military inspections which result in the discovery of criminal activity
5
or evidence.
These cases, taken together, may represent a new trend of judicial
activism in that many well established doctrines of military law are now
being questioned and re-evaluated by COMA in light of contemporary
circumstances. This trend should provide new guidelines for the application of the fourth amendment to the military community, guidelines which
will insure maximum protection for the constitutional rights of service
personnel. These guidelines, however, will be established only if COMA
1
The Manual for Courts-Martial deals with lawful search in paragraph 152, which holds
evidence against the accused inadmissible at a trial by court-martial:

If it was obtained as a result of an unlawful search of the person or property of
the accused conducted, instigated, or participated in by an official or agent of the
United States, or any State thereof or political subdivision of either, who was acting
in a Governmental capacity; or
If it was obtained without the freely given consent of the accused as a result of
an unlawful search of another's premises on which the accused was legitimately
present, and the search in question was conducted, instigated, or participated in by
an official or agent of the United States, or any State thereof or political subdivision
of either, who was acting in a Governmental capacity; or
If it was obtained as a result of a seizure or examination of property of the
accused upon an unlawful search of anyone's property, unless the presence of the
property of the accused was due to trespass, whether or not the accused was present,
and the search in question was conducted, instigated, or participated in by an
official or agent of the United States, or any State thereof or political subdivision of
either, who was acting in a Governmental capacity.
152, United States, 1969 (rev.) [hereinafter cited as MCM].
Manual
for Courts-Martial
2
United States v. Chase, 24 C.M.A. 95, 51 C.M.R. 268 (1976); United States v. Mayton, 23
C.M.A. 565, 50 C.M.R. 784 (1975); United States v. Jordan, 23 C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664
(1975), aff'd on rehearingon othergrounds,24 C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976). See notes 5972, infra, & text accompanying.
sUnited States v. Jordan, 23 C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664 (1975), aff'd on rehearing on
other grounds, 24 C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976). See notes 28-39, infra, & text
accompanying.
4
United States v. Kinane, 24 C.M.A. 120, 51 C.M.R. 310 (1976). See notes 40-58, infra, &
text accompanying.
5
United States v. Thomas, 24 C.M.A. 228, 51 C.M.R. 607 (1976); United States v. Miller,
24 C.M.A. 192, 51 C.M.R. 437 (1976). See notes 6-28, infra, & text accompanying.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:223

restricts the deviations from civilian constitutional protections to those
areas where the need for such deviations can clearly be demonstrated to be
of paramount military importance. The court's increasing reluctance to
accept all governmental claims of military exigency is one indication that
COMA is continuing to move in the proper direction.
LEGITIMATE INSPECTION OR ILLEGAL

SEARCH: CONTINUING CONFUSION

It has always been the rule that inspections in the military are not
subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment so long as the
purpose of the inspections relates to ascertaining the fitness of the
command to perform its military function and not to the discovery of
evidence for use in a criminal action. 6 The main controversy in military
law with regard to inspections centers, instead, around the question of
when a legitimate inspection becomes an illegal search because evidence of
criminal activity will probably be discovered.
A recent decision of the court, United States v. Thomas,7 does little to
resolve, and may even exacerbate the uncertainty present in the area of
military inspections. Even though all three of the military judges in
Thomas reached a similar result, each wrote a separate opinion with a
differing rationale and analysis. None of the opinions is entirely consistent
with previous case law.
United States v. Thomas: A Sharply Divided Court
The Thomas case involved the use of a marijuana detection dog during
a barracks inspection after reports had been received that the odor of
marijuana was present in the barracks. During the inspection, the dog led
his handlers to the accused's locker. Marijuana was found and, ultimately,
the accused was convicted for wrongful possession of marijuana. The
precise question of whether the mere use of a marijuana dog was a search
6
See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 24 C.M.A. 95, 51 C.M.R. 268 (1976), where the Court of
Military Appeals stated that an Air Force regulation providing for gateway inspections of
vehicles entering or departing an Air Force installation would be permissible if done on a
random basis for the purpose of safeguarding government property, but inspections
undertaken in order to discover evidence of crimes involving personal non-governmental
property would be impermissible. See also United States v. Carter, 24 C.M.A. 129, 51 C.M.R.
319 (1976), where it was stated that a commander or his delegate must determine, with regard
to administrative inspections, whether or not there is probable cause to inspect whenever the
inspection is for the purpose of ferreting out criminal violations. It should be noted that the
court based this conclusion on Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), which held that a
warrant procedure was not necessary to conduct welfare inspections which were non-criminal
in nature. The result in Carterwould also be compelled by United States v. Lange, 15 C.M.A.
486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965), which held that if the purposeof an inspection was the discovery of
evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, then the inspection was really a search which

would have to comply with the fourth amendment. See generally, H. MOYER, JusTIcE AND THE

MILITARY §§ 2-185 to 189 (1972).
724 C.M.A. 228, 51 C.M.R. 607 (1976).
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per se was not decided by the court since there was no formal holding in
the case. There was no formal holding because no two judges would agree
8
on a theory upon which the result of the case could be predicated. After
Thomas the question was still undecided as to whether the use of a
marijuana dog was a legal method of inspecting or of obtaining informadon upon which a determination of probable cause could be based. Since
the usage of marijuana dogs and inspections in general are both important
topics in the military, it is helpful to examine the separate opinions in
Thomas to determine the direction of the court on those subjects.
Chief Judge Fletcher's opinion 9 called for allowing inspections under
all circumstances, even when the purpose was the discovery of criminal
activity, provided that in all instances evidence of any criminal activity so
discovered would be excludable at any criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding.1 0 This position is supported by the doctrine of military necessity,"
at least to the extent that the importance of determining the fitness of the
command outweighs any damage done to individual rights of privacy.
Under this approach, whenever there is suspicion of criminal activity
which amounts to less than probable cause to search, the military would be
permitted to act without observing fourth amendment standards in order to
insure that the command is continually ready to fulfill its military
2
mission.'
SJudge Cook based his reversal on the failure of the officer in charge to obtain proper
authorization to conduct the search. Although authorization had been obtained, Judge Cook
found that no valid determination of probable cause had been made because the officer in
charge had either omitted or misstated material facts in obtaining the authorization from the
issuing officer. Judge Ifletcher's opinion called for reversal on the grounds that evidence
discovered during an inspection should be excludable at any criminal or quasi-criminial
proceedings. Judge Ferguson reversed because he viewed the use of the marijuana dog
as a search conducted without probable cause which led to the discovery of the incriminating
evidence used at the accused's trial.
924 C.M.A. at 233, 51 C.M.R. at 612.
"oSee Note, The Right to Counsel at Summary Courts-Martiak COMA at the Crossroads,
(1976), infra for a discussion of quasi-criminal and criminal proceedings.
52 IND. L.J. "See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (legal justification for the doctrine of military
necessity). Generally the idea of military necessity assumes a military society, apart from the
civilian world, where, due to the special nature and importance of the military function,
unconstitutional activity by the government may be legitimized if such activity is for the
purpose of furthering vital military needs. This is true even if the constitutional rights of
individual servicemen must be sacrificed in the process.
"The primary difficulty with Judge Fletcher's approach is that the exclusionary
rule is transformed from a means for protecting privacy into an end in itself. By
compromising rights of privacy in general, and then relying on the exclusionary rule as the
sole method for prevention of abuse, Judge Fletcher's recommendation fails to protect
service personnel from violations of privacy which are not prosecution oriented. Preserving
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures should be the focus of judicial guidelines in
this area and not the mere prevention of incarceration.
But see Committee for G.I. Rights v. Calloway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975), which
sanctioned warrantless inspections without probable cause as part of a drug abuse prevention
program instituted by the Army. The program complained of involved unannounced taking
of urinalyses from soldiers involved in the rehabilitative program with the possibility that
adverse test results could be used as the basis for punitive action. In finding the inspections to
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Judge Cook would also sanction the use of marijuana dogs during
inspections but for entirely different reasons. Judge Cook's position was
that service personnel have no reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the inspection of government property, in this case a government
barracks and common corridors thereof. Without a reasonable expectation
of privacy or a proprietary interest in the area being searched, service
personnel have no standing under the fourth amendment to object to the
search/inspection which has taken place."3 This position would only
protect from search/inspections that personal property of service personnel
which was properly stored in its designated place.14 Everything else would
theoretically be government property which officials would be free to
"inspect" at any time regardless of whether the place to be "inspected" was
15
a common area or an individual's room.
be constitutionally permissible the court relied to a great extent on the military necessity
argument, emphasizing the seriousness of the drug problem in the military. Id. at 476-77.
Judge Fletcher's opinion in Thomas was very similar to the analysis used in the G.I.
Rights case, except that he would exclude all the evidence obtained during the inspection
from use in any disciplinary or criminal proceeding. By striking a balance between military
necessity and individual fourth amendment rights, Judge Fletcher allows military necessity to
become a two-way doctrine where governmental as well as individual rights are sometimes
limited because of the special nature of the military. This approach seems to be a more
reasonable solution to the problem than the one reached by the federal court in the G.L Rights
case, since the primary purpose of the doctrine of military necessity, i.e. insuring the fitness of
the command, would be fulfilled without making the violation of individual rights or privacy
more egregious by bringing prosecution as a result of evidence obtained during the violations.
Although this kind of exclusionary rule vitiates the plain view doctrine, it is not an onerous
burden for the government to bear. Its officials can still obtain criminal evidence in the usual
manner if prosecution is their main concern.
It has already been mentioned that Judge Fletcher's proposal, arguably, makes the
exclusionary rule an end in itself since the rule will no longer be operating as a deterrent to
the invasion of individual rights of privacy. Although these allegations may be true, the
exclusionary rule still serves to deter searches which had previously been disguised as
legitimate inspections. A blanket rule such as the one in question could possibly be more
effective in curtailing disguised searches than the "purpose rule" of United States v. Lange, 15
C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965), which apparently required a specific finding of intent to
discover evidence of criminal activity before the inspection would be treated as a search. It
remains to be seen whether the approach of Judge Fletcher or that of Judge Perry, who
advocated a purpose type inquiry in United States v. Roberts, 25 C.M.A. 39, 54 C.M.R. 39
(1976), see note 25 infra, will be most effective in protecting the rights of privacy of military
personnel.
"3See MCM 152, 1969 (rev.), at note 1 supra. See also United States v. Miller, 24 C.M.A.
192, 51 C.M.R. 437 (1976) (per curiam opinion adopting 50 C.M.R. 303 (A.C.M.R. 1975))
which adopted the proposition that service personnel also had the right to object to searches
which violated their reasonable expectations of privacy; See note 15, infra, & text accompanying.
4One problem with this approach is that it fails to deal with the problem of inspections
under the concept first expressed in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that the fourth
amendment protects people and not places or things. Judge Cook's over reliance on
proprietary concepts seems to be out of line with post-Katz views concerning the parameters of
the fourth amendment.
sBut see United States v. Miller, 24 C.M.A. 192, 51 C.M.R. 437 (1976) (per curiam opinion
adopting 50 C.M.R. 303 (A.C.M.R. 1975)), which adopted the position that under some
circumstances service personnel could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their rooms.
Judge Cook dissented on the ground that the government had a right to inspect property
in which it had a proprietary interest for any or no reason. In effect Judge Cook's inspections
for no reason would be illegal exploratory searches.
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The basic difference between the positions taken by Judge Fletcher and
Judge Cook is that Judge Cook does not recognize the existence of any
fourth amendment rights inuring to service personnel who occupy government provided rooms or barracks except the right to be free from
unreasonable searches of their person. Judge Fletcher, on the other hand,
recognizes the existence of servicemen's right to be free from governmental
intrustion generally, without any governmental property distinction. He
also feels that the doctrine of military necessity only requires that these
constitutional rights should be sacrificed to the extent that it is absolutely
necessary.
Judge Ferguson authored the third opinion in Thomas, expressing the
view that the use of a dog "trained to ferret out the presence of contraband
drugs ' 1 6 constituted a search under the fourth amendment as applied to the
military. Consequently, he felt that fourth amendment procedures and
safeguards must be implemented if the fruits of the marijuana dog search
are to be admissible at a trial by court-martial. Since there was no probably
cause to search the accused's locker for marijuana, Judge Ferguson found
the search to be unreasonable and its fruits inadmissible. In reaching his
conclusions, Judge Ferguson relied less on policy arguments and more on
previous case law than either Judge Cook or Judge Fletcher. The main
7
source of case law support for his position was United States v. Unrue.1
Although the fruits of marijuana dog inspections were admissible under
the circumstances there presented, Unrue implicitly treated such inspec18
tions as searches which, under the fourth amendment, must be reasonable.
Basically, the argument is that Unrue, in holding that the marijuana dog
search was "not unreasonable,"1 9 assumes that the use of the dogs
constitutes a search. The legality of the search in Unrue turned on the
presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the
subjects of the search. Only a finding of such an expectation of privacy
would allow the subjects standing to challenge the marijuana dog search,
which under normal circumstances would usually be conducted without
probable cause and hence be violative of the fourth amendment. Although
Judge Ferguson cited other cases, both civilian and military, in support of
his position, 20 the real key to his opinion is the assumption that Thomas
had an expectation of privacy in his wall locker, and for this proposition
he gives no case support.2' As between Judge Cook's view of no reasonable
expectation of privacy for sevice personnel occupying government property
and Judge Ferguson's finding of such an expectation, the recent case
1624 C.M.A. at 236, 51 C.M.R. at 615.
1722 C.M.A. 466, 47 C.M.R. 556 (1973).
' 8See 22 C.M.A. at 470, 47 C.M.R. at 560.
191d. (held that under the circumstances the subjects of the inspection no longer had an
expectation of privacy).
2024 C.M.A. at 237-38, 51 C.M.R. at 616-17.
2124 C.M.A. at 238, 51 C.M.R. at 617.
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23
law tends to support the latter position.22 In United States v. Miller,
COMA adopted the lower court's holding that service personnel do have a
reasonable expectation of freedom from unauthorized governmental activity in their rooms. Inspections were listed as an authorized governmental
activity, but the validity of the use of a marijuana dog as part of a
legitimate health and welfare inspection was not decided.2 5 Although the
possibility of the court's holding use of marijuana dog to be legitimate
government activity is not precluded by Miller, the case did establish that
under some circumstances an expectation of privacy does exist for service
personnel occupying government property. For this very reason Judge
Cook dissented in Miller, using the same arguments that he later employed
in the Thomas case. Depending on the approach taken by Judge Perry,
who recently replaced the retiring Judge Ferguson, if a marijuana dog
inspection case were to be decided today, the court could follow any one of
the opinions written in Thomas. In any event, the next case should address
some of the difficult problems raised by the Thomas case in such a manner
as to maintain military preparedness without sacrificing individual liber25
ties any more than is absolutely necessary.
22
See, e.g., United States v. Whittler, 23 C.M.A. 121, 48 C.M.R. 682 (1974), as another case
which tends to support Judge Ferguson's assumption of an individual's having a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his wall locker. Whittler held that a search of the accused's living
quarters must be supported by a valid probable cause determination even if his personal living
area is the only place where incriminating evidence is likely to be found. This decision and
similar cases cited therein, id. at 122-23, 48 C.M.R. at 683-84, express a concern about the need
for fourth amendment protection in the personal living area of service personnel quartered in
barracks. As with the Miller case, see note 15 supra, Whittler is not conclusive as to the
existence of an expectation of privacy as to a wall locker but it does undercut Judge Cook's
argument of no expectation of privacy under any circumstances.
024 C.M.A. 192, 51 C.M.R. 437 (1976) (per curiam opinion adopting 50 C.M.R. 303
(A.C.M.R.
1975)).
2
1Md.
25
Shortly before this note was published COMA decided United States v. Roberts, 25
C.M.A. 39, 54 C.M.R. 39 (1976), which dealt with a marijuana dog inspection similar to the
one conducted in Thomas. At approximately 4:30 A.M. a search party entered the accused's
barracks and announced that an inspection was taking place. Individual barrack's rooms were
searched with the marijuana detection dog. Upon entering the accused's barracks room, the
dog alerted on a cabinet, indicating the presence of marijuana within. As a result of this
action, a search of the cabinet was conducted and marijuana was found. The accused was
later convicted for possession of marijuana in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1970).
Judge Perry, writing the lead opinion, adopted the basic position of his predecessor,
Judge Ferguson, by concluding that military personnel have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their living quarters which is protected by the fourth amendment. In addition,
Judge Perry found that "shakedown inspections" were unreasonable searches since they were
conducted in a general manner, without probable cause and for the purpose of discovering
evidence of criminal activity. According to Judge -Perry, all inspections are searches with
"fitness inspections" being reasonable and "shakedown inspections" unreasonable. Given Judge
Perry's definition of "shakedown inspections" as those inspections which search specifically
for criminal goods or evidence, it would seem that this new rule merely incorporates the
purpose test of United States v. Lange, 15 C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965). In any event
marijuana dog inspections are considered "shakedown inspections" by Judge Perry especially
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Conclusion

One of the problems which remains unresolved by the Thomas
decision, although recognized by Judge Fletcher, concerns the extent to
which the military, on grounds of military necessity, can conduct inspections for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in a criminal or
quasi-criminal prosecution without making such inspections in compliance with the fourth amendment. No matter which way the expectation of
privacy issue is resolved, there will still be a need to establish limits on the
military necessity doctrine as it applies to search and seizure law. Otherwise

all fourth amendment rights will be abrogated by the doctrine. It has been
suggested that a limitation of the scope of military inspections as
determined by their precise purpose be worked out in a manner similar to
the administrative search warrants presently employed in civilian inspections. 2 6 If some specificity of purpose were required, similar to the statutory
authorization needed for a civilian inspection, 27 it would be easier to
ascertain whether the inspectors were engaged in legitimate military
procedure when they discovered the incriminating evidence or whether they
were merely poking around, using the pretense of an inspection to cover
impermissible investigatory behavior. If standards are established (by
regulation or other) which specifically delineate the circumstances under
which "fitness" inspections may be undertaken when criminal violations
are suspected, then even inspections based on less than probable cause will
be valid for all purposes. A procedure of this kind would increase the
likelihood that rights of privacy would not be arbitrarily, and hence unreasonably, violated.
A compromise solution, which allows all inspections while employing
an exclusionary rule with regard to evidence of criminal activity, thereby
in cases like Roberts where the areas searched are the private rooms of members of the
military.
Judge Fletcher, relying on his opinion in Thomas, concurred in the result reached by
Judge Perry. He did not, however, agree with the rationale. Since Judge Cook dissented,
Roberts is just like Thomas in that there is no formal holding in either case because no two
judges would agree on a theory which would support the result the court ordered. Judge
Cook dissented for reasons similar to those which he expressed in the Thomas case.
As a practical matter it would appear that after Roberts marijuana dog inspections will
be useless as a police tactic since evidence obtained by such means will be inadmissible at
court-martial. This remains true despite the fact that Roberts does not hold that such
inspections are illegal. So long as Judge Fletcher is willing to exclude evidence which was not
seized26by illegal means this anomalous situation will continue.
Comment, Inspections, 54 Ma. L. REv. 225, 246 (1971).
27
1n civilian inspections, the test for determining whether there is "probable cause" to
issue a search warrant is not the usual test of whether it is more likely than not that the
violation in question has been committed, but only that it be shown that reasonable legislative
or administrative standards for conducting inspections have been satisfied. See Camara v.
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Similar rules or regulations could be promulgated in the military to safeguard service
personnel from totally arbitrary invasions of privacy and at the same time meet the need of
insuring that the command is fit to perform its military mission.
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maintaining a semblance of fourth amendment protection, seems to be a
reasonable means of dealing with an intractable problem. Nevertheless the
question always remains of whether the need for ascertaining command
fitness is so great, especially where domestically based non-combat troops
are concerned, that the fourth amendment rights of service personnel to be
free from warrantless invasions of privacy should be sacrificed.
FOREIGN

SEARCHES

Because the activities of military personnel subject to court-martial
jurisdiction involve contact with the people and governments of foreign
nations, military courts have been called upon to determine the admissibility of evidence obtained by searches conducted by foreign police
officials.2 8 United States v. Jordan29 is a significant case recently decided by
COMA which deals with the problems of foreign searches.
In Jordan the search in question was initiated by British police who
suspected the accused, an American serviceman, of having committed
several burglaries. Before searching the room of the accused, which was
located off-base, the British police contacted American officials, two of
whom accompanied the British officers to the accused's room. The
American officials unlocked the padlock on the accused's locker and
provided a photographer to take pictures of the stolen property discovered
in the room.
In the initial hearing of Jordanin 1975, the court had held that "search
and seizure in a foreign country must feet Fourth Amendment standards in
order [for the fruits thereof] to be admitted in evidence in a trial by courtmartial, regardless of whether it is obtained by foreign police acting on
their own or in conjunction with American authorities." ' 30 On rehearing,
the government argued that this rule would encourage the trial of military
personnel in foreign courts inasmuch as evidence which is obtained by
foreign officials in searches which do not meet fourth amendment
standards would be inadmissible at a trial by court-martial. Therefore, if
the accused were to be prosecuted for a violation of foreign law, the trial
would have to be in a foreign court. Trial in foreign courts was thought to
28

See generally H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 2-118 to 120 (1969).
2924 C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976), modifying United States v. Jordan, 23 C.M.A. 525,
50 C.M.R. 664 (1975).
s023 C.M.A. at 527, 50 C.M.R. at 666. COMA's decision in the first Jordan case had
overruled United States v. DeLeo, 5 C.M.A. 148, 17 C.M.R. 148 (1954), which had held that the
"mere presence" of American officials at the scene of a foreign search did not automatically
trigger application of the fourth amendment. Rather, it was only when American officials
participated to a recognizable extent in the search conducted by foreign officials that the
fourth amendment requirements would be applied at a trial by court-martial. On rehearing
Jordan, COMA again found the DeLeo doctrine as stated above inadequate "to safeguard the
constitutional rights of servicemen stationed in a foreign country." 24 C.M.A. at 159, 51
C.M.R. at 378.
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be undesirable in that service personnel would enjoy none of their
constitutional rights in a foreign court, resulting in what many Americans
would perceive as less than an adequate administration of justice in the form
of severe penalties and general lack of "due process." 3'
In its decision after rehearing, the court agreed with the government
that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by
extending its application to foreign officials who are in no way affected by
American judicial decisions. 32 This retrenchment, however, required that
the court again examine the DeLeo doctrine to ascertain whether it
provided an adequate standard for determining when American involvement in a foreign search reached such a level as to require observation of
fourth amendment procedures and safeguards if the fruits of such a search
were to be admitted at a trial by court-martial.
The new guidelines handed down by the court centered primarily on
33
whether or not there was any trace of participation by American officials.
If American officials were present at the scene of a foreign search the fourth
amendment procedures, as applied in the military, must have been
observed. Otherwise, the fruits of the search will be inadmissible at a trial
by court-martial of the person who was the subject of the search. Also, if
American officials are not present but "provide any information or
assistance, directive or request, which sets in motion, aids, or otherwise
furthers the objectives of a foreign search,"3 4 then fourth amendment
procedures must again have been followed if the evidence is to be
admissible at the subject's court-martial. Furthermore the court held that if
the search is conducted solely by foreign authorities the evidence must still
be suppressed, on motion, unless it is shown to have been obtained in
35
accordance with the laws and procedures of the foreign authorities.
Finally, the evidence may also be inadmissible if the foreign search shocks
36
the conscience of the court.
M24 C.M.A. at 157-58, 51 C.M.R. at 376-77.
32This result is logical in that it is obvious that exclusionary remedies such as the one
used in the first Jordancase will not work in cases such as this, where foreign officials who are
handing over the evidence are not motivated by a need to comply with the United States'
criminal procedure. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), which involved the
admissibility in federal court, under the so-called "silver platter" doctrine, of evidence illegally
obtained by state or local authorities. In holding that all evidence must have been obtained in
accordance with federal law in order for it to be admissible in federal court, without regard for
who had obtained it, the Court formally repudiated the "silver platter" doctrine. By doing so,
the Court removed any incentive for either state or federal officials to conspire to "legally"
obtain evidence in contravention of the fourth amendment.
If there is no conspiracy between American and foreign officials, a foreign search
conducted by foreign officials will be made without regard to whether the fruits of the search
will be admissible at a trial by court-martial. The search will be conducted with an eye
toward admissibility in the foreign courts and therefore, if the military refuses to admit
such evidence at a court-martial, they leave the foreign officials no choice but to try the case
under foreign law.
3324 C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378.
"Id.
551d.

3d.
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Applying the new guidelines to the facts of the case, the court ruled
that because of the direct American participation, the foreign search and
any fruits thereof were subject to fourth amendment standards at the
accused's trial by court-martial.3 7 An analysis of the holding in the latest
Jordan case reveals that the court has successfully set up standards which
should reduce uncertainty as to what is impermissible conduct and should
maximize the amount of protection given to a serviceman accused of a
crime. The factual determination required under the new standards, that is
presence and aid in any manner, will be much easier to apply. As a result,
police officials who make a good faith effort to comply with the rules will
not be faced with overly precise distinctions between lawful and unlawful
actions. By also allowing the admissibility of the fruits of a search in a
trial by court-martial to be dependent on the validity of the search under
foreign law when there is no American participation, the court increases
the number of cases in which the military can take jurisdiction, thereby
protecting the accused from the vagaries of foreign judicial systems.
The real reason behind the prohibition on unlawfully seized evidence
as determined by foreign law may be a policy that a serviceman who is the
victim of an unlawful act should not have the harm exacerbated by having
the evidence admitted at his court-martial. The Jordan decision also, to a
degree, brings the military into line with the federal courts on the question
of foreign searches.3 More importantly, a crucial addition not specifically
included in the Brulay-Stonehill9 doctrine of the federal courts on foreign
searches was made by the court in its new guidelines. Military courts, unlike
the federal courts, are free to prohibit admission of evidence, even if it is
lawfully seized under foreign law, if the foreign search is unconscionable in
the minds of the judges. This again exhibits notions of what the court
believes to be fundamental fairness, in that servicemen should not be
penalized by the admission of evidence secured by reprehensible means even
if those means are sanctioned by foreign law.

3724 C.M.A. at 160, 51 C.M.R. 379.
"'The federal courts have generally held that a foreign search conducted solely by foreign
officials does not have to comply with fourth amendment standards in order for the fruits of
that search to be admissible at trial in the United States. See, e.g., Brulay v. United States, 383
F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967). It should be noted, however, that in
Jordan the military has not adopted some other aspects of the federal law concerning foreign
searches. The court has not sanctioned the use of evidence which is illegally obtained under
foreign law. United States v. Stonehill, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), adopted the position that
legality of the search under foreign law was irrelevant because the participation of American
officials was the determining factor with regard to whether or not the evidence was admissible.
If there was participation, the fourth amendment applied and the evidence would be subject to
exclusion. If there was no participation the evidence would be automatically admissible.
39

d. There was some suggestion in the opinions that evidence might be excluded if the

method of seizure shocked the conscience of the court. It was, however, not raised by the facts
of the cases so the question was not specifically decided.
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SEARCHES INCIDENT TO APPREHENSION:
UNITED STATES V. KINANE

In United States v. Kinane40 the court dealt with the problems of a
search made incident to a lawful apprehension. 4' Article 9a of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) states that "[a]rrest is the restraint of a
person by an order ... directing him to remain within certain specified
limits." 42 Paragraph 19c of the Manual for Courts-Martial deals with
apprehension, which is co-terminous with arrest and custodial arrest in the
military, and provides: "An apprehension is effected by clearly notifying
the person to be apprehended that he is thereby taken into custody. The
order of apprehension may be either oral or written." 43 The Kinane case
was primarily concerned with two questions: when has an apprehension
taken place, and may a search precede the apprehension and still be
lawfully incident to apprehension.
An Apprehension Requires An Order
United States v. Fleener,44 a case dealing with a search incident to
lawful arrest, had held that an apprehension has occured "[i]f the totality
of facts reasonably indicate that both the accused and those possessing the
power to apprehend are aware that the accused's personal liberty has been
restrained, even in the absence of verbalization. '45 Thus, the Fleener court
had construed the "clearly notifying" language of the Manual's paragraph
19c to have been satisfied if the accused was "aware" that his freedom of
46
movement had been restricted.
In Kinane the court found this definition to be overly broad and,
referring to Article 9a, held that an order, either actual or constructive, is
needed in order for apprehension to be made. This result was thought to
be necessary because temporary detentions, such as the one in Kinane, do
4024 C.MA. 120, 51 C.M.R. 310 (1976). In Kinane the accused was suspected of stealing
seven identification cards and was apparently searched before he was placed under arrest.
4
1MCM fl 152, 1969 (rev.), provides that the following searches are among those which are

lawful:
A search conducted as an incident of lawfully apprehending a person, which
may include a search of his person, of the clothing he is wearing, and of property
which, at the time of apprehension, is in his immediate possession or control, and a
search of the place where the apprehension is made; but a search which involves an
intrusion into his body, as by taking a sample of his blood for chemical analysis,
may be conducted under this rule only when there is a dear indication that evidence
of crime will be found, there is reason to believe that delay will threaten the
destruction of the evidence, and the method of conducting the search is reasonable.
4210 U.S.C. § 809a (1970).
3MCM T 19c, 1969 (rev.).
4421 C.M.A. 174, 44 C.M.R. 228 (1972).
45
146 d. at 181, 44 C.M.R. at 235.
1d.
4
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not clearly communicate the "permanent deprivation of liberty" associated
with custodial arrests or apprehensions. 7 The court also held that the
order of apprehension is not limited to written or oral means of
communication but may be implied from the "circumstances surrounding
the arrest." 4 8
In further developing the procedures for placing someone in custody,
the court declared that an order of apprehension may be given in any of
three ways: "by word of mouth, by writing, or by the circumstances
surrounding the arrest."4 9 Part of paragraph 19c of the Manual is in
conflict with this ruling since it requires an order to be oral or written. 0 In
dealing with this conflict the court held that paragraph 19c is void to the
extent that it attempts to limit the validity of orders of apprehension and is
inconsistent with Article 9a.5 1
The holding of the Kinane case with regard to when an apprehension
occurs is somewhat anomalous. The court, while enlarging the manner in
which an accused may be informed of an apprehension under the UCMJ,
restricts the scope of apprehension to include only permanent deprivations
of liberty. It would seem that there is only minimal difference between
"circumstances surrounding the arrest" which give rise to a clear notification of apprehension and temporary detentions which do not give such
notification. As a result of this lack of a well defined distinction there will be
a great temptation to justify temporary detentions, after the fact, as custodial
apprehensions whenever the detention produces any incriminating evi5 2
dence that would be inadmissible under stop and frisk guidelines.
4724 C.M.A. at 124, 51 C.M.R. at 314. The idea of "permanent deprivation of liberty" as
an indication of custodial arrest was derived from Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 (1973).
See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27
(1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). The Supreme Court has said in these cases that in
some instances, such as temporary detentions, a seizure of the person may take place which
does not constitute custodial arrest.
4824 C.M.A. at 124, 51 C.M.R. at 314. In effect the only definite change which the court
made in the Kinanecase was to disallow application of the term "apprehension" to temporary
detentions. The result is that now the only allowable search of one temporarily detained
would be a frisk rather than a full search incident to arrest as was previously permitted. The
court stated that only minimal intrustions into the privacy of the accused would be allowed
prior to custodial arrest. This proposition was supported mainly by Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291 (1973), which holds that a full search incident to arrest, as provided in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), is not justified prior to formal arrest in the absence of a search
warrant. Absent exceptional circumstances, it appears that pre-arrest searches in the military
are limited, as in civilian situations, to a frisk. Cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4924 C.M.A. at 124, 51 C.M.R. at 314.
5OSee note 43, supra, & text accompanying.
51Article 36 of Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970), provides
for the establishment of rules of procedure in military tribunals. -Theauthority to make such
rules has been delegated to the President provided that such rules are not inconsistent with the
UCMJ. The Manual for Courts-Martial is the result of the Article 36 delegation and carries the
force of law. However, as the court correctly points out, any MCM provison is void to the extent
it conflicts with the UCMJ.
52See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40.(1968);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under present civilian law a pat down weapons search of a
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Perhaps this temptation could best be removed by requiring oral or written
notification for all apprehensions without an exception for "circumstances
surrounding the arrest." Such a rule seems to be a small price to pay in
relation to the interests involved.
The second part of Kinane deals with the question: may a search be
justified as incident to a lawful apprehension if it takes place prior to the
accused's formal custodial arrest. From the facts presented, the trial court
determined that Kinane was placed under arrest after the search.53
A recent Supreme Court case, Cupp v. Murphy, 4 provides the major
support for the position that some searches are allowable prior to custodial
arrest. In Cupp, the Court held that when police have probable cause to
arrest a suspect, they may legitimately search that person for purposes of
preserving "highly evanescent evidence" 55 that was exposed to all who saw
the accused, without actually making the arrest. The court in Kinane
distinguished Cupp on the ground that the search of Kinane and the
seizure of the I.D. cards he had stolen went beyond the limited scope of the
Cupp exception. Furthermore, the court said that there was no showing of
military necessity which would require a different application of the Cupp
56
exception to military personnel.
If it can be assumed that the search occurred before apprehension, then
the analysis of the court would appear to be quite reasonable since the
Cupp case is indeed a rather specific exception. The problem lies in the
question of when apprehension occurred. Using the criteria laid down by
the majority for determining when apprehension occurs, it could have been
found that the apprehension occurred before the formal arrest under the
"circumstances" test. This issue was not dealt with, however, since the
court regarded the time of apprehension as a question of fact conclusively
determined by the lower court. 57 As the dissent of Judge Cook correctly
points out, all that the trial court decided was when in fact the accused was
placed under formal custodial arrest and not when the arrest took place for
constitutional purposes.5 8 Under the guidelines established by the court,
suspect's outer clothing is permitted even in the absence of probable cause to arrest if it
appears that the temporary detention of the suspect was justified based on the facts of the
situation and the officer had reason to believe that the suspect might be armed and dangerous.
5
3Kinane was suspected of stealing some identification cards from an area where he had
been working. After being confronted Kinane produced the stolen I.D. cards. Kinane
maintained at trial he was told to empty his pockets. In any event, the trial court-found that
the accused was placed under arrest after the I.D. cards were produced; he was then taken to
the investigations office and searched again.
5412 U.S. 291 (1973).
55
1d. at 296.
s24 C.M.A. at 126, 51 C.M.R. at 316.
5
rThe court, it would appear, was less than candid when they decided to treat
apprehension as a question of fact determined by the trial court which was binding them. In
the first half of its opinion the court redefined apprehension. As a consequence, the trial
court's determination of apprehension, although factual in nature, was based upon an
erroneous legal premise of when apprehension or arrest actually occurs.
5824 C.M.A. at 126, 51 C.M.R. at 316.
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the finding of when formal arrest in fact took place is not determinative of
when the accused was clearly notified that he had been directed to remain
within certain specified limits. Statutory arrest can occur without either
written or oral notification if the accused is somehow clearly notified as
required. Whatever justification there is for inclusion of the "circumstances" language in the definition of apprehension, it would seem to be
outweighed by the risks to constitutional rights of servicemen that are
inherent in a broad reading of the language. The mere presence of such
language, even if narrowly construed, introduces uncertainty into the jobs
of law enforcement officials. These officials would be able to do their jobs
much more efficiently if there were specific procedures that had to be
followed.

Conclusion
It is clear that the court felt that a more objective standard. was needed
for making determinations concerning when apprehensions had occurred.
At the same time, however, the court did not feel compelled to adopt a
completely objective standard and, hence, the inclusion of the "circumstances" language in the new test.
The court's willingness to recognize that an order may be implied from
the "circumstances surrounding the arrest" may indicate several things. It
could be that the court is hoping to provide an objective standard for trial
courts to follow in the majority of the cases while leaving open the
possibility that COMA may ultimately review the small number of cases in
which the order for arrest will not have been given by "word of mouth" or
in "writing." This approach would allow COMA to exercise general
supervisory power over the military justice system by setting out, on a case
by case basis, the criteria which would be involved in determining what
"circumstances" communicate the order of arrest.
On the other hand, COMA may be totally abdicating the field in favor
of trial courts by making the question of apprehension a factual determination which technically should always be made by the trial court. It may
be that COMA feels its time and effort could best be spent on other
problems of military law. In any event, the fact that COMA declined to apply
the new guidelines to the facts of Kinane leaves the issue, as to future
consequences of those guidelines, in doubt for the time being.
COMA

AND

CONSENT SEARCHES:

RULE OF LAW FORBORNE

The Manual for Courts-Martial lists the consent search as one type of
lawful search. 59 The two requirements which must be satisfied in order for
59MCM

f

152, 1969 (rev.), provides that the following search is lawful:

A search of one's person with his freely given consent, or of property with the
freely given consent of a person entitled in the situation involved to waive the right
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a consent search to be valid in either a military or civilian setting are that
the consent must be voluntarily given and the person consenting must be
one empowered to waive the fourth amendment privilege with regard to the
60
area to be searched.
Three major cases of COMA's 1975-76 term primarily concerned the
question of the voluntariness of an accused's consent to a search. In United
States v. Jordan,6' the accused replied to a request for permission to search
with the answer "Yes, I can't really stop you." The court interpreted this
response as indicating that the accused, already in custody, felt he was
powerless to prevent the search; therefore his affirmative reply was not a
free and voluntary consent. Similarly, in United States v. Mayton, 62 a reply
of "Alright" or "OK" to a request to search was found to be no more than
mere submission to a game warden's assertion of authority. 63 In United
States v. Chase64 the court focused on the law enforcement officer's
language and found that the request for consent to search was made with
such an assertion of authority that the accused could have reasonably
believed that he was not allowed to refuse. 65 Furthermore, the court added
in a footnote that a presumption against consent arose under the
circumstances because the certain discovery of incriminating evidence
would presumptively make any consent to search unreasonable; therefore,
the accused must have felt that he had no alternative but to comply. 66 In
sum, the accused exhibited an acquiescense in each case which COMA
found insufficient on the facts to show free and voluntary consent.
to immunity from an unreasonable search, such as an owner, bailee, tenant, or
occupant as the case may be under the circumstances.
See also H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 2-112 to 179 (1969).
6°See note 59 supra. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
6123 C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664 (1975), af'd on rehearing on other grounds, 24 C.M.A.
156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976). A British police officer suspected the accused, an American
serviceman, of having committed several burglaries. After interrogating the accused at the
local police station, the officer informed the accused that he intended to have a look at the
accused's room. Immediately thereafter the policeman requested permission to search.
6223 C.M.A. 565, 50 C.M.R. 784 (1975). In Mayton, the accused was stopped by two game
wardens who were on patrol. After the accused told them that he was looking for a place to
fish, one of the wardens said he would like to conduct a weapons and game check. The
accused replied either "OK" or "alright."
61
3 d. at 566, 50 C.M.R. 758. This finding resulted despite the fact that the game warden
only said he would "like" to conduct a search and not that he was going to conduct a search
regardless of the accused's wishes.
6424 C.M.A. 95, 51 C.M.R. 268 (1976). Chase involved a gateway inspection at an Air
Force base as the accused was attempting to leave the base in a van. A security policeman
informed the accused that he was conducting a vehicle search and requested the production of
the accused's I.D. card. It was argued by the government that the accused's cooperation in
allowing
the events to transpire constituted a consent to search.
65
1d. at 98, 51 C.M.R. at 271.
66d. at 98 n.7, 51 C.M.R. at 271 n.7.
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Impact on Prior Standard of Voluntariness
The court has consistently held in the past that if the totality of the
circumstances indicates that the accused merely acquiesced to a claim or
show of authority then the search was illegal; but the court has usually not
been easily persuaded that the accused did no more than acquiesce. 67 The
court's increased receptiveness to the concept of acquiescense may mean
that, given the inherently order-oriented nature of military life, a mere
request for consent to search will become an assertion of authority to the
same degree as the game warden's request in Mayton.68 Therefore, unless
the accused's answer unambiguously indicates that he knows he has the
right to refuse, the defense of mere submission to a show of authority will
seemingly always be available. In light of the presumption against consent
which was used by the court in Chase,69 these decisions will have the
practical effect of severely curtailing the number of consent searches which
may be upheld at trial.
The impact of these changes bolster the argumerilt that it would be
better to lay down a broad prophylactic rule which would always require
warnings in order for a consent search to be valid.70 Even though COMA
seems to recognize the inherently coercive nature of the military, as
evidenced by the ease with which it found acquiescense in Mayton and
other consent cases, it has nevertheless refused to require the procedure that
67

See, e.g., United States v. Noreen, 23 C.M.A. 212, 49 C.M.R. 1 (1974); United States v.
Vasquez, 22 C.M.A. 492, 47 C.M.R. 793 (1973); United States v. Rushing, 17 C.M.A. 298, 38
C.M.R.
96 (1967).
6
Although the game wardens in Mayton were military personnel, they did not actually
order the accused to let them search, nor did they explicitly coerce him in any manner. In
effect, the court found that the search was involuntary based on the implied coerciveness of the
situation. The amount of implied coercion in Mayton does not appear to be in excess of the
amount normally present in a military atmosphere. Any confrontation between an accused
and a military law enforcement officer would contain the same degree of coerciveness that was
present in Mayton when the warden made his statement. See note 62 supra. This amount of
coerciveness would seem to be part of everyday life in the military.
69
See note 66 supra & text accompanying.
10The Supreme Court, however, has never accepted this position and recently held in
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), that no warnings are necessary even though the
accused has been taken into custody when the request for consent to search is made. In United
States v. Collier, 24 C.M.A. 183, 51 C.M.R. 428 (1976), the Court of Military Appeals cited
Watson when it found that someone in a custodial situation need not be given any additional
warnings concerning consent searches if the Miranda/Tempia warnings had been given (in
United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967), COMA had found that the
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
applied to military interrogations of criminal suspects). But see United States v. Cady, 22
C.M.A. 408, 47 C.M.R. 345 (1973), where COMA held that a consent to search was revocable
either before the search had begun or while it was in progress, a view the Supreme Court has
not adopted. The mere fact that the Supreme Court has yet to require the use of warnings in
civilian circumstances should not automatically preclude COMA from requiring them,
whether the basis be the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the doctrine of military
necessity. The court should extend the protection of warnings to servicemen as it did in the
Cady case regardless of the minimum protection required by the Supreme Court. COMA
nevertheless, has ill-advisedly decided to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in Watson. See
the argument developed at pp. 239-40, infra.
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would effectively remedy the coerciveness of the situation - preliminary
7
warnings. '
The Need for Preliminary Warnings
In a society based on discipline and strict obedience of orders, it is hard
to imagine a voluntary consent to search if the accused is not aware of his
right to be free from unreasonable searches. The arguments for mandatory
warnings are more persuasive in the military context than in civilian
circumstances. A civilian does not ordinarily perceive the refusal of a
police officer's "request" as a punishable offense. Disobedience of an
analogous "request" in a military context will be much more likely to
appear to be a punishable offense to military personnel uninformed of their
right to refuse compliance. By failing to require warnings before a request
for consent to search will be deemed non-coercive and hence valid, the court
penalizes those who were not only ignorant of their right to refuse, but who
were also, unfortunately, unable to manifest their ignorance to an extent
which will compel a court to find mere. acquiescence under the guidelines
of Mayton, Chase and Jordan.
A determination regarding the voluntariness of an accused's consent
should not depend on the fortuity that the accused had made some
statement from which it may be inferred that he had a faulty conception of
his rights. Furthermore, efficacy in law enforcement may also be undercut
by not requiring warnings. This will be the effect where someone who, if
he had been properly informed of his rights would nonetheless have
consented to the search, is allowed to consent in ignorance of his rights. He
is therefore able to successfully challenge the search at a later time on
grounds of acquiescence by raising as a defense his lack of comprehension
about his right to refuse to consent at the time of the search.
It may be that the court is afraid that a rule requiring warnings will go
too far, in that too many cases might involve consent searches which could
be invalidated because of a lack of technical conformity to the rule. This
would be the case, despite the fact that the defect in the warning was trivial,
unless the court would be willing to adjudicate guidelines of materiality.
The current approach of acquiescense versus consent, however, does not
even present this opportunity; the judges make their determinations on the
facts of each particular case.
Although they can limit reversals by
exercising their discretion in only those cases which contain the more
egregious abuses, nevertheless, the problem with this approach is the
number of variables which become involved.
It would seem that
constitutional rights are endangered to the extent that those unpredictable
variables enter into the decisionmaking process. 72 The changing personnel
71
See Note, Self-incrimination in the Military Justice System, 52 IND. L.J. -_ (1976),
infra.72
A related problem is that to the extent that courts engage in open-ended "polycentric"
problems, which are less justiciable than issues framed in terms of the applicability or
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of the court, the type of evidence discovered, the nature of the offense and
the personality of the accused can all enter into the final determination of
voluntariness. The more that these subjective elements enter into the
determination, the more watered down fourth amendment rights will be.
These arbitrary factors could be eliminated by the requirement of a
warning. Voluntariness could then be presumed in most instances after a
valid warning had been given. This would insure an equal and just
application of the right to be free from unreasonable searches to all
military personnel and would allow consent searches to occur whenever an
accused is truly willing to co-operate.
CONCLUSION

In recognition of our civilian society's increased sensitivity to individual rights of privacy, COMA has moved toward the establishment of a
military justice system which will protect, whenever possible, the privacy of
military personnel to the same degree as if they were civilians. Protecting
the constitutional rights of military personnel to the maximum extent
possible without jeopardizing military preparedness is a difficult task with
which COMA must continue to deal. While recognizing that military
personnel have rights of privacy protected by the fourth amendment,
COMA must also weigh the effect that the exercise of those rights will have
upon the ability of the armed forces to function in an acceptable manner.
The key to the effective implementation of this new policy is to
critically differentiate between those claims of military necessity which
have continued vitality and those which are justified only on grounds of
tradition. A continuing re-evaluation of the role and make-up of the
military justice system is an absolute necessity if COMA is to be anything
more than a mere rubber stamp for governmental claims of military
exigency.
Recent cases indicate that COMA is seriously reviewing the traditional
governmental claims of military necessity and that they will continue to do
so. It should be good news to the many Americans presently serving in the
armed forces to know that their rights of privacy and right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures will not be arbitrarily or unnecessarily
abridged by the military justice system.
WILLIAM M. POPE
propriety of legal rules, see generally Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 PRoc.
AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. 1, 5, the courts undermine the adjudicative process in general and their
own integrity in particular. If COMA seriously wishes to exercise general supervisory
jurisdiction over the military justice system, see Note, Building a Systermi of Military Justice
through the All Writs Act, 52 IND. L.J. - (1976), supra, it would do well to try to cause
legal determinations which now turn on factual conjuration and conclusion drawing - e.g.
voluntariness - to coalesce into issues more easily justiciable - compliance with a legal rule.
See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J.
467, 469-70 (1976).

